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Abstract
Much of the time, polluting firms lobby against environmental protection, but there
are major exceptions to this rule, for example in the regulation of both ozone and
greenhouse gases. Political support from firms can be pivotal for governments trying
to protect the environment. I offer an explanation for this phenomenon, suggesting
firms behave as they do in order to steal market share from their rivals. I develop a
model in which a polluting firm makes a clean technology investment and then lobbies
successfully for strong environmental protection, since this will shift market share away
from its rival who has not made the clean investment. The key result concerns the
impact of lobbying on the equilibrium outcome: for a region of the parameter space,
it is only because of firms’ lobbying that environmental protection is achieved. This
is because lobbying increases a firm’s returns to going green, by increasing the market
share it can steel. The net effect of this distortion is an increase in welfare.
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to answer the question ‘when might polluting firms support environmental
protection, and what difference does this make to the level of environmental protection
a government chooses?’ Lack of political support is a major reason why environmental
regulations are either delayed or permanently weak.1 Political support for environmental
protection can come from a number of places, but it is arguably most valuable when it
comes from business. Many environmental policymakers would go so far as to say that this
is almost a necessary condition for feasible environmental regulation - when there appears
to be conflict between ‘the economy’ and the environment, the environment tends to lose.2
Firms spend significant resources on lobbying3 and there is a general perception that
polluting firms inevitably use their lobbying power to slow down, water down, or entirely
block measures to protect the environment. This is indeed the case much of the time,4 but
there have been major and important exceptions to this rule. The following two examples
motivate much of the paper.
The protection of the ozone layer was arguably the biggest environmental problem of
its time. During the 1980s, regulators were attempting to draw up global rules to limit
the production of ozone-depleting CFCs and encourage investment in cleaner alternatives.
Until 1988, the major ozone-polluting firms had all opposed environmental regulation and
successfully used their influence to limit protection of the ozone layer. The largest producer,
the US firm DuPont, had lobbied for decades against regulation.5 However, in March 1988
1Oates and Portney (2003) review the literature on the political economy of environmental protection.
2Stern (2015).
3For example, in the US in the five years prior to 2017, $1.7 billion was spent on lobbying over energy and
natural resources, the majority of which was campaign contributions (according to the Center for Responsive
Politics, www.opensecrets.org, accessed on 13 Dec 2017). The EU is far less transparent, so financial flows are
hard to obtain, but according to Dinan and Wesselius (2010) there are perhaps 30,000 lobbyists in Brussels,
the same as the number of EU Commission employees.
4Oreskes (2010) details attempts to block environmental protection by polluting firms.
5Benedick (1998) gives a definitive and first hand account of the history of ozone protection, as he was
the lead US negotiator to the Montreal Protocol.
2
DuPont abruptly announced that it no longer opposed regulation and in fact now wanted a
complete phase-out of global CFC production. DuPont’s new political support for regulation
is widely seen as the turning point in the story of ozone protection.6 The European producers
continued to lobby against reductions but were unsuccessful: the Montreal Protocol and its
successor treaties achieved a total phase out of CFCs. It has been suggested that DuPont’s
lobbying for regulation may have been in its economic self interest. Since it had already
made investments in cleaner production technologies that would give it an advantage over
its rivals in the clean substitute market, DuPont potentially stood to gain market share.7 In
the words of DuPont director Joseph Glass, ‘when you have $3 billion of CFCs sold worldwide
and 70 percent of that is about to be regulated out of existence, there is tremendous market
potential.’8 A key feature of DuPont’s lobbying was for controls to be as strong and as
international as possible, so that their major European rivals would be affected.
The DuPont example is perhaps particularly straightforward, but similar dynamics are
also likely to be operating on various levels in the more complex case of climate change. In
the run up to the Paris Agreement, a coalition of major oil and gas producers was among
those calling for the introduction of a global carbon price. Europe’s six largest oil and gas
companies (BG, BP, Eni, Shell, Statoil and Total) argued in an open letter to the UN sent
on 29 May 2015 for the introduction of an ambitious carbon price. If this were introduced,
they argued, they could invest in reducing their emissions by, for example, increasing the
proportion of gas they produce (which is relatively clean). The letter also hints at another
effect of the carbon price: ‘reduced demand for the most carbon intensive fossil fuels’ -
that is, coal, their biggest competitor product, with a market share of global energy supply
around 30%.9 A moderately strong carbon price would shift market share away from coal and
6See Barrett (2003) for further details.
7DuPont probably had several reasons for making this move; all that is argued here is that profit is likely
to have been one of them. Smith (1998) gives a detailed discussion of DuPont’s potential motives.
8Quoted in Gilding (2012).
9IEA Key World Energy Statistics (2014).
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towards gas, creating, to paraphrase the DuPont director, ‘tremendous market potential’. It
is hard not to see this lobbying, at least in part, as an attempt by the oil and gas companies
to steal market share from the coal companies.10 Although climate regulation is on-going,
stronger political support from the private sector is considered by many policy makers to
have helped achieve the Paris Agreement in 2015.11
Hence there are clear examples of major polluting firms lobbying for environmental reg-
ulation of their markets, and this political support can substantially increase the ability of
governments to protect the environoment.12 This paper asks, by modelling these kinds of
situations, when and how a firm like DuPont might choose to invest in a costly clean tech-
nology, knowing it will be able to influence the political process to get regulations passed
that will result in increased market share and so greater profits.
An outline of the model and results presented here is as follows. In the baseline model
there are two identical firms, each of which can invest in a new green production technology
or keep their old polluting technology. A government then chooses the emissions tax they
are subject to, and the firms can influence this choice through lobbying. The result is
that, for a region of the model’s parameter space, competition between the firms causes one
firm to choose to go green and lobby for strong environmental protection, so that it gains
market share in the new regulated market, while the other keeps the old technology and
opposes environmental regulation. The lobbying results in the equilibrium emissions tax
10This lobbying probably had multiple aims. For example, by participating actively in the political process
of carbon pricing, the oil and gas companies might be able to keep the carbon price from being too much
higher than they would like, or by sorting it out sooner rather than later, they might be able to reduce
uncertainty around long run demand for their product. All that is argued here is that stealing market share
from coal may be one of the reasons for this kind of lobbying.
11For example, Nicholas Stern’s response to the Paris Agreement included: ‘... businesses have been
strongly represented at the Paris climate change summit and have played an important role in urging
governments to achieve a strong agreement.’ (New Climate Economy, newclimateeconomy.net, accessed on
29 Jan 2016.)
12Barrett (1992) gives other instances of this kind of behaviour. For example, in response to concerns over
the environmental impact of phosphates, the German firm Henkel invested in a phosphate-free detergent,
lobbied for controls and gained market share in France and Germany in the 1980s. Puller (2006) also details
several examples. More generally, this process need not be limited to environmental regulation.
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being distorted above the Pigouvian level, and increasingly so as the government becomes
more open to lobbying. The key result concerns the interaction between the political process
and firms’ green investment choices: there are situations where it is only because a firm can
lobby, and therefore secure strong environmental protection, that it will see it as worthwhile
to go green. At the same time, it is only because of a firm’s political support that the
government can take environmental action. Lobbying can therefore induce a switch to a
greener economy.
This is the key result of the paper, but I go on to make five further points. First, for
other regions of the parameter space (for example, when environmental damage is higher, or
green investment costs lower), both firms choose to go green in equilibrium instead of just
one. Here, although no lobbying conflict is observed, the threat of loss of market share if a
firm doesn’t go green, intensified by lobbying, helps to sustain the equilibrium. Second, the
welfare implications of these two types of lobbying-induced switches to a greener economy
are characterised, and I show that if lobbying induces a switch then it must also be welfare
improving. Third, the model can be generalised to the case of n firms and variants of all the
key results developed in the two firm case continue to hold, though now with coalitions of
green and brown firms. The two firm model is therefore appropriate for examining situations
with more than two firms, so the bulk of the paper focuses on this simpler set up. Fourth, the
results are robust to various different product market assumptions. However, the extent to
which lobbying makes the green investment more attractive to firms falls as demand becomes
more elastic, because the market share effect is partially offset by the total market shrinking.
Fifth, I discuss three reasons why lobbying-induced switches to a greener economy may not
always be observed in practice.
The findings presented here are related to three strands of the economics literature. First,
the paper sits within the wide literature on the political economy of environmental regulation.
Stigler (1971) argued that regulation is largely the result of profit seeking by firms. Buchanan
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and Tullock (1975) pointed out that different environmental regulations vary substantially
in their distributional consequences, and suggested that firms ensure the regulations chosen
are those that most increase their profits. One strand of the contemporary political economy
literature builds on these insights by focusing on lobbying as the mechanism by which firms
influence policy. Grossman and Helpman (1994) were the first to apply the common agency
model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to lobbying, which has now become standard.13
Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998) first applied it to environmental policy making, showing
that an environmental lobby group can counter the influence of a polluters’ lobby group
and thereby bring about environmental protection. This remains an active and productive
area of research.14 However, the standard result is that polluting firms always lobby against
environmental protection: for the externality to be adequately controlled, a lobby group with
environmental preferences is needed.15 The model presented here, therefore, offers a novel
and complementary explanation of the political processes behind environmental regulation.
Another branch of the environmental political economy literature follows Salop and
Scheffman (1983), who argued that firms often attempt to raise their rivals’ costs, as this
gives them a competitive advantage. Barrett (1991) discusses this in various environmental
contexts. Sartzetakis (1997) presents a model in which an exogenously designated ‘leader’
13Lobbying can alternatively be thought of as a process of information transmission, and therefore an
application of Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s model of strategic information transmission. Which of the two
types of lobbying takes place in reality is context dependent (see Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a
discussion). This paper focuses on buying influence.
14Damania (2001) shows that polluting firms can use dirty investments as a commitment device to aid
their lobbying efforts; Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) look at the relationship between trade and environmental
regulation when firms can lobby; Wilson and Damania (2005) explore the environmental impact of corruption
at different levels of government; Aidt (2010) shows how recycling revenue from green taxes can be used
strategically by firms seeking to lower their tax burden; MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2012) show that lobbying
considerations may, counterintuitively, make non-revenue raising environmental regulation the most preferred
option for governments; Habla and Winkler (2013) show how national lobbying can play an important role
in international environmental agreements.
15The only exception to this I am aware of is in Fredriksson and Sterner (2005), who show that when
firms can capture the revenue from environmental taxes, some firms support higher taxes. In my model,
this channel is shut down, as no firm receives any revenue from environmental taxes (or, equivalently under
a cap-and-trade scheme, receives any permits for free).
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firm can manipulate the price of emissions permits, which raises rivals’ costs. Aside from its
focus on lobbying, my model differs from this in that there are no exogenous asymmetries
between the rival firms, yet in equilibrium they can behave differently. Puller (2006) analyses
the strategic incentives of firms to innovate in order to influence regulatory standards and
so raise their rivals’ costs. He shows that this effect can counter the well-known incentive to
reduce innovation in order to ratchet down regulation. My paper complements this analysis
by looking explicitly at the role of lobbying in the formation of regulation that raises rivals’
costs.
The second broad area of the literature this paper relates to is the Porter Hypothesis (the
idea that firms often gain rather than lose from environmental regulation). My model gives
rise to a version of the Porter Hypothesis without relaxing any of the optimising assumptions
of standard economic theory.16 Hence, it suggests a new mechanism that can give rise to
this familiar result.
Third, this model also shares various features with those in the literature on competitive
R&D and endogenous technical change. In the competitive R&D literature,17 firms under-
take R&D in an imperfectly competitive market because doing so brings them a competitive
advantage, usually lower relative costs, allowing them to gain market share. The approach
taken here can be thought of as an extension of this literature by modelling two sequential
investment choices. First, a standard R&D investment (in clean technology) that impacts
firms’ relative costs; second, a political investment (in a high emissions tax) that is highly
complementary to the R&D. Looked at in this way, it is the complementarity of the invest-
ments that means that, when offered together they will be undertaken, whereas in isolation
they may not. Finally, this paper is relevant to the current literature on endogenous techni-
16Porter and Linde (1995) give the original statement of the argument, which holds that ‘$10 bills are
waiting to be picked up’, that is, in reality firms are not profit maximising. Other explanations consistent
with optimising behaviour are based on market power, asymmetric information and R&D spillovers (see
Ambec et al. (2013)).
17See, for example, Reinganum (1983).
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cal change.18 For example, Acemoglu et al. (2016) present and estimate a dynamic model in
which formerly polluting producers choose between investments in clean or dirty production
methods. In the absence of significant R&D subsidies, very high carbon taxes are needed for
the transition to clean technologies. The present paper can be seen as complementing this
literature, by offering one explanation for how such taxes can be politically achieved.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the baseline model is
presented. Section 3 contains the key results: equilibria are characterised and discussed.
Section 4 examines the welfare consesquences of the results. In Section 5 the model is
generalised to n firms, and robustness is considered. Section 6 concludes with a discussion
of the limitations of the theory.
2 The baseline model
The baseline model contains two firms and a single government who play a three stage
game. First the firms choose whether or not to invest in costly, but emissions-free production
technology. Then in the second stage the government sets an emissions tax, which the firms
attempt to influence through lobbying. In the third stage firms produce and earn profits.
2.1 The economy
There are two firms, 1 and 2. Each firm i ∈ {1, 2} produces a quantity xi of a single
homogenous good. They each face an initial choice over their production technology fi ∈
{G,B}. They can choose the clean, ‘green’ production technology fi = G, in which case
production by the firm results in no emissions. Alternatively they can choose the dirty,
‘brown’ technology fi = B, in which case production is polluting and each unit of output
results in a unit of emissions. Choosing fi = G costs s > 0. This could represent the building
18See, among others, Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Aghion et al. (2016).
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of a new factory or power station, some kind of R&D, or any other step to reduce emissions.
Choosing fi = B is free, reflecting the idea that the current technology is polluting and can
continue to be used with no new investment required. Note that the cost structure of the
firms is otherwise unaffected by this investment choice; the only purpose of investing in clean
technology is to reduce emissions to zero.19 Each firm has emissions per unit of output ei
given by:
ei(fi) =

0 if fi = G
1 if fi = B
(1)
The firms face an emissions tax τ , resulting in a tax bill of τeixi. From the firm’s point of
view, the green investment can be thought of simply as a way to switch off the emissions tax
τ .
The firms have identical and strictly convex production costs. For tractability, I take
costs to be given by 1
2
kx2i , and normalise k to
1
2
.20 Denote by pii profits from production (as
distinct from total firm payoffs which include investment and lobbying costs). Given any
pair of technology choices by the two firms f ∈ {G,B}2 and emissions tax τ , firm i chooses
output xi to maximise profits from production:
pii(xi | τ, f) = pxi − 1
4
x2i − τeixi (2)
19In reality investment in new green technology does often have an impact on marginal cost, and this can
be a major investment incentive or disincentive. Abstracting away from this allows the paper to isolate a
separate reason for green investments.
20The only assumption important for the results is that costs must be strictly convex, of which a quadratic
cost function is the simplest, and
∑
ki = 1 gives the simplest analytical solutions. Convex costs ensure the
government faces an interesting tradeoff following f = (G,B); i.e., so that it would not always simply set
the tax to push the brown firm entirely out of the market.
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The market structure is as follows. First, demand is linear and given by:
x = 1− bp (3)
where x = x1 + x2, and b ≥ 0. Many of the proofs and examples will begin with the case
where b = 0, that is where demand is inelastic and equal to 1. Fixing the total size of the
market in this way generates simple analytical solutions that are useful for understanding
how competition for market share drives the key results. This low elasticity benchmark is
then contrasted with a high elasticity case and the results are shown to be robust.
The second product market assumption is that firms are price takers. This ensures there
is no strategic behaviour at the production stage, and so allows the model to focus cleanly
on the strategic interactions between the firms at the investment and lobbying stages.21 The
results are robust to this assumption: in Appendix A.4 the model is resolved for Cournot
competition, giving qualitatively equivalent but analytically less tractable results. The price
taking assumption also fits naturally with the n firm generalisation of the model presented
in Section 5.1.
2.2 The political process
After the investment choices have been made, the emissions tax τ is set by a government
with two aims: to maximise social welfare and to collect political donations from lobbyists.
Social welfare W is the utility of a representative citizen plus the impact of environmental
damage. Demand curve (3) implies that the representative citizen has quasilinear utility of
21Any assumption other than price taking will lead to production market failures, and the government
will therefore use the emissions tax partly as an instrument of competition policy, which would not be an
interesting or helpful feature of the model.
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the form u(x, y) = 1
b
(x− 1
2
x2)+y, where y is wealth (or consumption of a numeraire good).22
Wealth y is equal to total profits (pi1 + pi2), minus expenditure on x (px), plus emissions tax
revenue (τ
∑
eixi). Environmental damage is given by η
∑
eixi, where η ≥ 0 gives marginal
environmental damage.23 Combining the above gives welfare:
W (x, τ |f) = 1
b
(x− 1
2
x2) +
∑
pii − px+ τ
∑
eixi − η
∑
eixi (4)
The government also cares about political contributions c1 and c2 from the two firms, who
lobby the government over the level of τ . Bernheim and Whinston (1986) give an analysis
of games of common agency, which Grossman and Helpman (1994) apply to lobbying, and
I follow this now standard approach here. The problem is one of two firms (the principals)
attempting to influence the actions of the government (the common agent). They do this
through lobbying, which is represented by a contribution function Ci(τ) specifying how much
firm i will pay as a political donation to the government for each level of τ . The government
therefore seeks to maximise W (τ) + λ(C1(τ) + C2(τ)), where λ ≥ 0 determines the relative
weight the government gives to political contributions compared to social welfare. λ is the
openness to lobbying of the government: λ = 0 represents an incorruptible government only
interested in social welfare; as λ rises the government and its policies become increasingly
‘for sale’. Determining the effect of λ on the equilibrium outcome is the main aim of this
22The above utility function is not defined for b = 0. A complete specification of the utility function
for all b ≥ 0 implied by demand equation (3) is: u(x, y) =
{
1
b (x− 12x2) + y if b > 0
v(x) + y if b = 0
, where v(x) ={
0 if x = 1
−∞ if x 6= 1. This discontinuity in the utility function does not affect any real quantities in the economy,
even for b = 0, because demand is continuous at b = 0. It matters only when calculating welfares in Section 4.
A final assumption needed to infer this quasilinear utility function from linear demand is that it is everywhere
the result of an interior solution to the consumer’s utility maximisation problem.
23Linear environmental damage is likely to be a realistic assumption only for emissions within a limited
range: most environmental damage functions are ultimately convex (see Ackerman et al. (2009) for a dis-
cussion). However the qualitative nature of the results would be the same in either case, so the simplest
specification is used here.
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paper.
2.3 The overall game
Combining the above components, the model can be summarised as a three stage game:
Stage 1: Investment
• Firms i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose production technologies fi ∈ {G,B}.
Stage 2: Lobbying
• Firms i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose contribution functions Ci(τ),
• The government then chooses emissions tax τ ∈ R.
Stage 3: Production
• Firms i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose outputs xi ∈ R≥0.
• Prices are taken as given and the market clears.
Payoffs at the end of the game for government and firms are
Ugov = W + λ(C1 + C2) (5)
Ui = pii − Ci − s(1− ei) for i ∈ {1, 2} (6)
3 Equilibria
The relevant solution concept for a sequential game of this kind is the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.24 It is found by backward induction, starting at stage 3.
24Throughout the paper, I restrict my attention to pure strategies only.
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Stage 3: Production
Taking as given the investment choice f and emissions tax τ chosen earlier in the game,
each firm maximises profits (2) and prices adjust so that supply equals demand (3). This
gives equilibrium outputs x∗i (τ, f), price p
∗(τ, f) and profits pi∗i (τ, f) as a function of choices
made earlier in the game. Appendix A.1 contains a complete summary of the analytical
solutions to this and subsequent stages of the game.
Given the symmetry of the two firms, there are three different technology choices to
consider: f ∈ {(G,G), (G,B), (B,B)}.25 The production subgame following f = (G,G)
is the simplest. Both firms have made the clean technology investment, so produce no
emissions: ei = 0. The emissions tax therefore has no effect, and output is high and split
evenly between the two firms.
Next, consider the subgame following f = (G,B), where one firm goes green by investing
in the clean technology and the other stays brown by keeping the old technology. Denote,
with an abuse of notation, outcomes for the firm that chose fi = G with a subscript G,
and outcomes for the firm that chose fi = B with a subscript B. The green firm causes
no emissions, eG = 0, but the brown firm continues to pollute, eB = 1, and so must pay
emissions tax τ for every unit of production. This gives interior26 equilibrium output, price
and profits, which depend on the emissions tax τ as follows:
d
dτ
x∗G(τ, (G,B)) > 0,
d
dτ
x∗B(τ, (G,B)) < 0,
d
dτ
p∗(τ, (G,B)) > 0, (7)
d
dτ
pi∗G(τ, (G,B)) > 0,
d
dτ
pi∗B(τ, (G,B)) < 0,
d
dτ
∑
pi∗i (τ, (G,B)) > 0 (8)
Increasing the emissions tax τ has two effects on the goods market: shifting market share
25Because the two firms are ex ante identical, the (G,B) and (B,G) outcomes are equivalent.
26The solution to the game will be an interior equilibrium if, given the tax rate, each firm chooses non-
negative production. We will see a corner solution following (G,B) if the tax is pushed up to the point
where the brown firm ceases production. Throughout the main text I focus on the interior solution, with
the corner solution given in Appendix A.5.
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from the brown firm to the green firm, and increasing the price. The green firm would like a
high emissions tax τ since it will gain both market share and environmental rents resulting
from the price rise. These gains to the green firm can, loosely, be thought of as a kind of
first mover advantage if this simple static game were interpreted in a richer dynamic context.
The brown firm would like a low τ since this lowers its loss of market share, and limits the
fall in its net of tax price. The sum of profits is increasing in τ since production is shifted
to the firm receiving a higher net of tax price. This means that the green firm benefits
more from an emissions tax increase than the brown firm loses. This result is an important
feature of the production subgame, and one that will underpin many of the final results, so
is summarised in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Following investment f = (G,B), total profits are increasing in the emissions
tax τ , d
dτ
∑
pi∗i (τ, (G,B)) > 0. That is, the green firm gains more from increasing τ than the
brown firm loses.
Finally, consider teh subgame following f = (B,B). Both firms keep the old technol-
ogy, so both pay emissions tax τ . The firms produce equal output x∗B(τ, (B,B)) and earn
profits pi∗B(τ, (B,B)). For any b > 0, both output and profits decrease as the government
increases the emissions tax, which shrinks total output in the usual way. For b = 0, demand
is inelastic, so total output is fixed, and the tax has no effect on each firm’s output or profits.
Stage 2: Lobbying
In this stage, each firm seeks to influence the emissions tax, while the government balances
its two objectives of maximising social welfare and collecting political contributions from
each firm. Following the common agency approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), this
situation is characterised by the decision of a single agent (the government) affecting two
principals (the firms). Each firm announces a contribution function Ci(τ) which specifies
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how much it will donate to the government for any level of τ that might be chosen.27 Each
firm designs its contribution function Ci(τ) to encourage the government to distort the tax
in the direction that increases its own profits. The government observes the contribution
functions and chooses τ to maximise W (τ) + λ
∑
Ci(τ).
An outcome of this lobbying subgame will be an equilibrium if the government cannot
choose a better tax rate given the contribution functions it faces, and if each firm cannot
offer a contribution function that gives it a better payoff, given the function offered by the
other firm. More formally, given any f , a subgame perfect equilibrium of this lobbying game
is a tax rate τ ∗, and pair of contribution functions (C∗1(τ), C
∗
2(τ)) such that:
(i) For the government τ ∗ is a best response to (C∗1(τ), C
∗
2(τ)). That is,
τ ∗ ∈ arg max
τ∈R
W (τ) + λ(C∗1(τ) + C
∗
2(τ)).
(ii) For each firm i ∈ {1, 2}, C∗i (τ) is a best response to C∗j (τ). That is, there is no other
τ ′ and C ′i(τ) such that τ
′ is a best response to (C ′i(τ), C
∗
j (τ)) and pii(τ
′, f) − C ′i(τ ′) >
pii(τ
∗, f)− C∗i (τ ∗).
With no restrictions on Ci(·) this game has many equilibria. Following the now standard
approach in Grossman and Helpman (1994), equilibria are limited to those where firms offer
contribution functions of the form Ci(τ) = pii(τ) + ai, where ai is a constant. Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) term such strategies ‘truthful strategies’ and show that the resulting
equilibria are focal among the set of all possible equilibria, since only they are stable to
non-binding communication.
I can now find the equilibria of the lobbying subgame following each choice of f ∈
{(G,G), (G,B), (B,B)}. First, consider the subgame following f = (G,G). As mentioned
27The contribution function is formally equivalent to the kind of standard incentive contract offered in the
context of performance related pay. In reality lobbyists do not normally offer explicit contracts in such a
transparent way, but an implicit contract of this type underpins their use of political contributions to secure
favourable policies (see Grossman and Helpman (2001) for further discussion).
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above, the production outcomes in equation (13) are independent of the emissions tax in this
case, so no firm will spend resources lobbying and the government can choose any tax, which
has no impact on welfare. The equilibrium outcomes are therefore τ ∈ R, c∗G(G,G) = 0.
Now, consider the lobbying subgame that follows f = (G,B). Substituting profit func-
tions (13) into the truthful contribution functions Ci(τ) = pi
∗
i (τ, (G,B)) + ai, equilibrium
condition (i) gives the equilibrium emissions tax τ ∗(G,B). Condition (ii) gives the level of
contribution c∗i = C
∗
i (τ
∗) from each firm needed to maintain this as an equilibrium. The
equilibrium tax rate and two of its properties are:
τ ∗(G,B) =
8η + b(6η + bη − λ)
8(1− λ) + b(6− 4λ− bλ+ b) , τ
∗(G,B)|λ=0= η, d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) > 0 (9)
The contributions c∗i (G,B) are given by equation (14) in Appendix A.1. To understand
this result, consider the case where the government is not open to lobbying, λ = 0. The
government maximises social welfare and ignores potential lobbying, giving outcome τ ∗ = η
and c∗i = 0 for each i; we observe Pigouvian taxation and no political contributions.
28 As
λ increases, i.e. as the government becomes more open to lobbying, τ ∗ rises and so the tax
rate increasingly exceeds the Pigouvian level. This result is a consequence of Lemma 1 (that∑
pii is increasing in τ following f = (G,B)). The green firm would like a higher τ and so
chooses a contribution function that rewards the government for increasing τ , and the brown
firm will likewise reward the government for reducing τ . But by Lemma 1, the green firm
gains more than the brown firm loses from an increase in τ , so the green firm lobbies harder
than the brown. That is, the sum of the contributions will be increasing in τ and so in
equilibrium the lobbying distorts it upwards: the more the government is open to lobbying
the more the green firm gets its way. This result can be generalised in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. For any technology f , in equilibrium lobbying distorts the emissions tax τ above
28We would expect the Pigouvian tax because, given f , there is one market failure (environmental damage)
and an instrument (the emissions tax) which can implement the first best solution.
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the Pigouvian level if and only if total industry profits are increasing in the emissions tax;
i.e. when λ > 0, τ ∗(f) > η ⇐⇒ d
dτ
∑
pi∗i (τ, f) > 0.
This result is very general since it holds for any f , any number of firms and any market
structure. A proof of Lemma 2 follows almost immediately from contribution functions being
truthful, so that
∑
C∗i (τ) =
∑
pi∗i (τ) + a, where a is a constant. If the sum of profits is
increasing in τ then the sum of contributions will be too, so including it in the government’s
objective function (condition (i) above) will therefore increase the equilibrium tax above
the level optimal for social welfare alone (τ = η). Lemma 2 also identifies when lobbying
would distort the emissions tax below the Pigouvian level: in any situation where the market
structure is such that
∑
pi∗i (τ) is decreasing in τ .
Equilibrium contributions c∗G and c
∗
B are strictly positive for λ > 0, but their derivatives
with respect to λ are ambiguous. As λ rises the firms have more influence and therefore are
willing to spend more to get more, but the government also needs less compensation from
firms for losses in social welfare resulting from distortions in τ . In other words distorting
the tax becomes cheaper. These two effects tend to respectively increase and decrease c∗i as
λ rises.
Now consider the lobbying subgame following f = (B,B). Following the same procedure
as above, equilibrium condition (i) gives the equilibrium emissions tax τ ∗(B,B) and condition
(ii) gives the level of contributions. The tax rate is:
τ ∗(B,B) =
4η + bη − λ
4 + b− bλ , τ
∗(G,B)|λ=0= η, d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) ≤ 0 (10)
and the contributions c∗B(B,B) are given in equation (14). As in the previous case, in the
absence of lobbying, the government implements a Pigouvian tax. However, now the firms
gain from a lower tax, so as the government becomes more open to lobbying, the firms push
the tax below the Pigouvian level: d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) ≤ 0.
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Stage 1: Investment
Now consider the initial subgame, where each firm decides whether to invest in the new
green technology or keep the old brown technology, given their knowledge of how the game
will be played following each decision.
Substituting profits (13) at tax rate and political contributions (14) into firm payoffs (6),
gives the reduced form payoffs for each firm following each investment outcome. The payoffs
are summarised in table 1, and a full analytical description given in Appendix A.1.
Firm 2
G B
Firm 1
G
pi∗G(G,G)− s
pi∗G(G,G)− s
pi∗G(G,B)− c∗G(G,B)− s
pi∗B(G,B)− c∗B(G,B)
B
pi∗B(G,B)− c∗B(G,B)
pi∗G(G,B)− c∗G(G,B)− s
pi∗B(B,B)− c∗B(B,B)
pi∗B(B,B)− c∗B(B,B)
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the investment subgame. See Appendix A.1 for the full analytical
results.
The Nash equilibria of this reduced form game, along with τ ∗ and {C∗i (τ), x∗i }i∈{G,B}
from the next two stages, are the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the whole game. I will
henceforth refer to an equilibrium of the whole game by its investment choices f , omitting
for brevity the corresponding τ ∗(f), C∗i (f) and x
∗
i (f). An intuitive summary of the pos-
sible equilibria is as follows. If firms choose (G,G), then production profits are high and
symmetric, no political contributions are made, and both firms pay green investment cost
s. If firms choose (B,B) then production profits are low and symmetric, both firms lobby
the emissions tax below the Pigouvian level and both firms avoid the investment cost s. If
firms choose (G,B), then the green firm gains profits from increased market share and higher
prices (pi∗G(G,B) > pi
∗
B(B,B)), it must pay a political contribution (c
∗
G(G,B)) to push the
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tax up and stop its opponent firm from pushing it down, and it must pay green investment
cost s. The brown firm loses profits from loss of market share and lower net of tax prices
(pi∗B(G,B) < pi
∗
G(G,G)), it must pay a political contribution (c
∗
B(G,B)) to keep the emissions
tax from being even higher, but it avoids investment cost s.
The equilibria of the reduced form investment subgame can now be found. I focus on
two equilibria: (G,B) and then (G,G).
3.1 The (G,B) equilibrium
The asymmetric equilibrium (G,B) is of particular interest, since this features political
conflict between the firms. Using the payoff matrix in Table 1, the no-deviation conditions
for the two firms are:
s ≤ pi∗G(G,B)− pi∗B(B,B)− c∗G(G,B) + c∗B(B,B) (11)
s ≥ pi∗G(G,G)− pi∗B(G,B) + c∗B(G,B) (12)
The (η, λ, b, s) parameter space that gives rise to the (G,B) equilibrium can now be
characterised. For any (η, λ, b), let S be the set of values of investment cost s that satisfy no-
deviation conditions (11) and (12). That is, let S = {s ∈ R : inequalities (11) and (12) hold}.
Denote by |S| the absolute size of S, so that it is the range of investment costs that leads to
(G,B) in equilibrium, and is a function of the remaining parameters, (λ, η, b).
To make progress in deriving tractable results, it is useful to consider the case where b,
and therefore the elasticity of demand, is small. In the extreme case, with demand inelastic
and so b = 0, the size of the market is fixed and the model can concentrate purely on market
share effects, which are the focus of this paper. The analytical results in the following
propositions are derived for small b ≥ 0; Section 3.3 demonstrates the robustness of these
results to high demand elasticities.
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Proposition 1 (Existence of (G,B) equilibrium). For η sufficiently large, and b small:
(i) The (G,B) equilibrium exists, that is S is non-empty.
(ii) (G,B) is the equilibrium for a greater region of the parameter space as the government
becomes more open to lobbying, that is d
dλ
|S|> 0.
Proposition 1(i) confirms the intuition outlined in the Introduction that market share
considerations can indeed lead to one firm going green and the other staying brown. It is the
gain in market share that makes it profitable for one firm to go green; the second firm would
not find it profitable also to go green because they would not see this gain in market share,
and therefore stays brown. That such an asymmetric equilibrium exists is not a foregone
conclusion in a model where the firms are ex-ante identical, and is therefore of interest. A
firm needs no initial technological advantage (or head start of any other kind) over their
rival to find it profitable to go green and lobby for increased market share.
Proposition 1(ii) shows that as λ rises, a greater range of parameters give rise to the
(G,B) equilibrium. Interpreting this result more broadly and loosely, the (G,B) outcome
can be thought of as becoming in some sense more likely. The intuition for this result is that
the ability of firms to lobby - understood as the equilibrium response to the government’s
interest in political contributions - makes green investment more attractive.29 The green firm
is willing to lobby harder than the brown firm for the emissions tax to rise, so τ is increasing
in λ (Lemma 2). This extra lobbying results in an increase in profits that outweighs the
increased lobbying bill, so the green investment becomes more attractive. Hence, the firm
will be willing to make the green investment at higher costs s, tending to increase |S|. The
brown firm’s behaviour will be impacted by rising λ too, since staying brown involves an
ever larger loss of market share, tending to decrease |S|. However, this loss is smaller than
the green firm’s gain, so the overall effect is an increase in |S|.
29My use of the phrase ‘ability of firms to lobby’ here and subsequently refers only to the size of λ; it is
not a restriction on the contribution functions Ci they can offer.
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These same results can be understood graphically, as shown in Figure 1. The Figure
shows the regions of the (λ, s) parameter space that give rise to different investment choices
in equilibrium (holding η and b fixed). The solid line is the indifference curve of a firm whose
competitor has stayed brown (condition (11)). At points below the line, green investment
costs are low enough that it is profitable to go green, above the line it is better to stay
brown. The thick dashed line is the indifference curve of a firm whose competitor has gone
green (condition (12)), with optimal technology choices likewise above and below the line.
As expected, when green investment cost s is low, both firms prefer to go green since this
requires only a small investment and avoids market share being stolen by their competitor.
As s rises one firm will at some point find it profitable to stay brown, and eventually s will
be so prohibitively high that both firms will prefer to stay brown.
Figure 1: Equilibrium investment outcomes as a function of the parameter space (λ, s),
plotted for (b=0, η=0.3). The thick solid line shows the indifference curve of a firm whose
competitor has played B, the thick dashed line likewise if the competitor has played G.
Proposition 1(i) is demonstrated by the fact that the indifference curves lie one above the
other in the order they do: |S| is the vertical distance between the two lines. Proposition
1(ii) is demonstrated by the fact that the vertical space between the lines grows with λ.
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These results indicate that there are situations where is it only because of lobbying, i.e.
λ > 0 rather than λ = 0, that the economy ends up in equilibrium at (G,B) and not (B,B).
I will describe such economies as featuring a ‘lobbying-induced switch’ from (B,B) to (G,B).
(This description refers only to a comparative statics-type switch, not to a transition in the
dynamic sense.) To formalise this idea, it is helpful to define a new set: for any (η, λ, b), let
S ′(λ) = S(λ)\S(0). That is, S ′(λ) is the set of investment costs s that result in (G,B) when
openness to lobbying is λ, but would have given (B,B) if λ were 0. Proposition 2 gives two
key properties of S ′.
Proposition 2 (Lobbying-induced switches to (G,B)). For η sufficiently large and b small:
(i) Parameter constellations exist such that (G,B), and not (B,B), is the equilibrium
outcome, that is S ′ is non-empty.
(ii) The parameter space giving rise to a lobbying-induced switch to (G,B) from (B,B)
expands as the government becomes more open to lobbying, that is d
dλ
|S ′|> 0.
Figure 1 illustrates this result graphically. Proposition 2(i) is demonstrated by the exis-
tence of a wedge between the solid line and the thin dotted line labelled |S ′|, and Proposition
2(ii) is demonstrated by the size of this wedge increasing with λ.
In order to summarise these results (which are the main contribution of the paper) and
illustrate the importance of lobbying, consider the following comparative statics. Suppose an
economy has a government not at all open to lobbying (λ = 0) and green investment costs s,
such that the economy is at point P in Figure 1. A firm thinking of going green knows that
if it were to do so it would gain market share and increase its profits due to the introduction
of an emissions tax. But it also knows this emissions tax (τ ∗ = η) will not be high enough
to compensate it for the large green investment cost s, hence the equilibrium is for all firms
to stay brown and no environmental protection is achieved. If, however, the government
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were to be somewhat open to lobbying, say λ = 1
4
, with the same green investment cost the
economy would be at point P ′. Now the firm considering going green would reason that, if
it were to invest in the green technology, it could use the political process to push up the
emissions tax (to τ ∗ = 4
3
η for the parameter values used in Figure 1), and this would be
sufficient to cover the investment cost plus the political contribution needed to push up the
tax. The other firm will lobby to reduce τ , which keeps it from being even higher, but it
would prefer to lose some market share rather than pay the green investment cost itself and
so will stay brown. Hence, it is only the ability of a firm to influence the political process
and secure a high emissions tax that gives it an incentive to invest in the green technology,
and it is only because of the firm’s political support that the government takes strong action
on the environment. The welfare implications of this are given in Proposition 4 below.
3.2 The (G,G) equilibrium
So far I have focused on the asymmetric (G,B) equilibrium, since it involves firm conflict
in the lobbying subgame. However, the model may also help describe situations where all
firms make the green investment together and no market share ends up being fought over,
that is (G,G) is the equilibrium outcome. In this case, it is the threat of having its market
share stolen that will make each firm more likely to go green. Using an analogous approach
to that in Section 3.1, the properties of this equilibrium can be characterised as follows.
Let T be the set of investment costs that lead to (G,G) in equilibrium. That is, for any
(η, λ, b), let T = {s ∈ R : inequality (12) holds}. Unlike in the previous case, the existence
of the (G,G) equilibrium should not itself be a surprising result: given small enough green
investment costs, each firm will prefer to make the small green investment in order to avoid
emissions tax τ . I therefore move straight to the question of whether lobbying makes the
(G,G) outcome more likely, in the sense that it expands the parameter space that supports
this equilibrium.
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For any (η, λ, b), let T ′(λ) = T (λ)\T (0). That is, let T ′(λ) be the set of investment costs
that result in (G,G) when openness to lobbying is λ, but would not have given (G,G) if λ
were 0. T ′ captures those situations where (G,G) is the outcome only because a government
is open to lobbying, i.e. we have a lobbying-induced switch. The following results can now
be given.
Proposition 3 (Lobbying-induced switches to (G,G)). For any η, and b small:
(i) Parameter constellations exist such that (G,G), and not (G,B), is the equilibrium, that
is T ′ is non-empty.
(ii) The parameter space giving rise to a lobbying-induced switch to (G,G) from (G,B)
expands as the government becomes more open to lobbying, that is d
dλ
|T ′|> 0.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The more open a government is to lobbying, the
further the tax will be distorted above the Pigouvian level following (G,B), and hence the
more market share a firm will lose if it stays brown while its rival goes green. This threat of
an increasingly damaging emissions tax means firms become increasingly willing to go green
as λ rises. This point is made graphically in Figure 1. An economy with no lobbying is shown
at point Q, and is in equilibrium at (G,B). An otherwise identical economy, except that the
government is more open to lobbying, is shown at point Q′, and is in equilibrium at (G,G).
This result formalises the idea that, even when all firms in an industry go green together in
a seemingly ‘cooperative’ way, it may well be that it is only the threat of losing substantial
market share that keeps each individual firm from deviating. The welfare consequences of
this are given in Proposition 5 below.
3.3 The high elasticity case
The elasticity of demand is determined by the parameter b, from demand equation (3). The
above results were derived analytically for small b (starting with b = 0 and then exploiting
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the continuity of the relevant expressions in b) and are shown in Figure 1 for b = 0. The
complexity of the final analytical expressions when b > 0 (see Appendix A.1) makes closed
form versions of the above and subsequent propositions difficult to obtain when b is large.
In this section, I show that the qualitative results continue to hold for large b, though for
increasingly narrow (η, λ, s) parameter spaces.
First, note that the production and political stages still have tractable analytical solutions
when b is large. In particular, Lemmas 1 and 2 hold for all b, and it can also be shown that
d
db
d
dτ
∑
pi∗i (τ, (G,B)) < 0. That is, when b is large, increasing the emissions tax still increases
total profits, but by a smaller amount than when b is small. Intuitively, when the total size
of the market is very price sensitive, the green firm has less to gain from a tax rise because
the corresponding fall in total quantity is large: the market stealing effect is somewhat offset
by a market size effect. This means the equilibrium tax τ ∗(G,B)) falls in b, and approaches
the Pigouvian level from above. Hence, the impact of lobbying, qualitatively the same as in
the previous sections, falls as b rises.
Figure 2: Equilibrium investment outcomes as a function of the parameter space (λ, s). The
black lines show indifference curves when b = 0.75; for comparison the light grey lines show
the b = 0 case (and are the same as those in Figure 1). As before, η = 0.3 in both cases.
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Figure 2 demonstrates numerically for large b what Propositions 1-3 proved analytically
for small b.30 A region of the parameter space gives rise to (G,B) in equilibrium, and this
region expands as λ rises (Proposition 1), though the total size of the region is smaller than
in the b = 0 case. Likewise, regions of the parameter space give rise to lobbying-induced
switches to (G,B) and to (G,G), and the sizes of the regions rise with λ (Propositions 2 and
3); once again in each case, however, the region is smaller for b > 0 than when b = 0.
These results demonstrate that lobbying that supports environmental regulation might
be more prevalent in industries where the demand elasticity is low. If it is too high, strong
environmental protection shrinks the total market too much, offsetting any firm’s potential
gain in market share and therefore making green investments less attractive.
4 Welfare
Section 3 showed that the ability of firms to lobby can cause the economy to end up in a
greener equilibrium than in the absence of lobbying. In this section I ask whether these
lobbying-induced switches are welfare improving. In each case there are trade-offs between
increased environmental protection on the one hand, and investment costs and distortions
to the production profile of the economy as a result of lobbying on the other.
Using equilibrium outcomes from stages 2 and 3 in welfare equation (4), define an indirect
welfare function W (f) that depends only on technology profile f ; this includes all political
and production outcomes, but not investment cost s. Then define social preference  over
all technology profiles such that for any two technology profiles f, f ′ ∈ {G,B}2, f  f ′ if
and only if W (·) minus any green investment costs is higher for f than f ′.
30The Figure is plotted for b = 34 , chosen as it balances the need to for b to be large with the desire to
retain interior solutions for much of the parameter space (larger b give rise to corner solutions at smaller
values of λ).
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4.1 The (G,B) equilibrium
It can now be asked when being in equilibrium at (G,B) rather than (B,B), for example
P ′ rather than P in Figure 1, is socially preferable.31 Using the above definitions, (G,B) 
(B,B) if and only if W (G,B)− s > W (B,B). For any (η, λ, b), let Y = {s ∈ R : (G,B) 
(B,B)}. Y is the set of investment costs for which the greener (G,B) is socially preferred
to the dirtier alternative (B,B). Recall that S ′ is the set of investment costs for which the
economy is in equilibrium at (G,B) rather than (B,B). Hence, all such lobbying-induced
switches will be socially preferable if any economy in S ′ is also in Y , that is if S ′ ⊂ Y .
Proposition 4 (Welfare of lobbying-induced switches to (G,B)). For b small, any lobbying-
induced switch from (B,B) to (G,B) is socially preferable, that is S ′ ⊂ Y .
To understand this result, consider the social costs of being in equilibrium at (G,B)
rather than (B,B). In the (B,B) equilibrium, firms produce an equal share of output but
they lobby the tax below the Pigouvian level, resulting in too much environmental damage.
In the (G,B) equilibrium, lobbying distorts the tax above the Pigouvian level, which reduces
environmental damage. But it also distorts the production profile of the economy, both by
giving the green firm more than its efficient market share (convex cost functions making this
socially undesirable) and also by shrinking total output below the optimal level (for b > 0).
Proposition 4 shows that if the green investment cost s is large enough to induce a switch
from (B,B) to (G,B), then the net gain in welfare, from reduced environmental damage
plus increased product market distortion, more than compensates for s. All such switches
are therefore socially preferable.
31Note that λ does not have a direct effect on welfare in this set up. Its only effect is to introduce distortions
into the economy through τ∗.
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4.2 The (G,G) equilibrium
The same welfare analysis can be used to compare the (G,B) and (G,G) equilibria. (G,G) 
(G,B) if and only if W (G,G) − s > W (G,B). For any (η, λ, b), let Z = {s ∈ R : (G,G) 
(G,B)}. Recall T ′ is the set of investment costs for which lobbying induces the economy
to be in (G,G) rather than (G,B). Hence any lobbying-induced switch will be socially
preferable if all economies in T ′ are also in Z, that is if T ′ ⊂ Z.
Proposition 5 (Welfare of lobbying-induced switches to (G,G)). For b small, any lobbying-
induced switch from (G,B) to (G,G) is socially preferable, that is T ′ ⊂ Z.
This result is perhaps less surprising than the previous proposition. As outlined above,
the (G,B) outcome features product market distortions, both in the firms’ shares of pro-
duction and total output. In contrast, there is no product market distortion in the (G,G)
case, since both firms have clean production technologies and so output is shared evenly
and at the socially optimal level. Moving from (G,B) to (G,G), therefore, reduces both
environmental damage and product market distortions. Hence, if the investment cost is such
that a lobbying-induced switch occurs, it will be more than compensated for by the above
two welfare gains.
5 Extensions and robustness
5.1 Generalisation to n firms
In this section I generalise the model by allowing the number of firms to be any n ∈ N.
The results for the special case of n = 2 characterised in the previous sections are shown to
qualitatively hold in the more general case. Let nG be the number of firms that chose fi = G
in stage 1. Solving the model in an analogous way to the n = 2 case in Section 3 gives
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equilibrium outcomes as a function of nG at each stage. The details are given in Appendix
A.3.32
Proposition 6 (n-firm equilibrium existence). For any η, b = 0, λ sufficiently close to 0,
and any n ∈ N:
(i) Any number of green firms can be supported as the unique equilibrium. That is, for all
nG ∈ {0, ..., n} there exist regions of (η, λ, s) space such that S(nG) is non-empty.
(ii) The equilibrium number of green firms n∗G decreases with the green investment cost s.
The results in the above proposition are demonstrated numerically in Figure 3, plotted
with n = 5. Like Figure 1, this shows which regions of the (λ, s) parameter space give rise
to different n∗G equilibria. Proposition 6(i) is demonstrated by each number of green firms
nG ∈ {1, ..., n} being supported by some different green investment s for small λ. Proposition
6(ii) is demonstrated by the number of firms going green in equilibrium falling as the green
investment becomes more expensive, for intuitively straightforward reasons.
The n-firm case more closely describes the real world examples discussed in the Intro-
duction. In the case of the ozone layer and DuPont, n∗G = 1 and n ≈ 5, with just DuPont
lobbying for environmental protection and a handful of others opposing. In Figure 3, points
P and P ′ illustrate the importance of lobbying for the equilibrium outcome. In the case of
climate change and the European oil and gas companies, n∗G = 6 and n is large. However,
the key insights gained from the two-firm model remain largely in tact in the n-firm case.
5.2 Cournot and other models of competition
The baseline model assumes firms take prices as given. As discussed, by abstracting away
from strategic product market behaviour, this allows the model to focus cleanly on the
32I focus on the case where λ is close to 0, which (hopefully) represents many modern economies. Goldberg
and Maggi (1999), among others, estimate Grossman and Helpman’s trade protection model. They estimate,
for the US, openness to lobbying λ to be positive but small, around λ = 0.02.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes as a function of the parameter space (λ, s), plotted for n = 5
and with (b=0, η=0.2).
political and investment stages of the game. In this section I demonsrate the robustness
of these results, by outlining the solution to the model with Cournot competition in the
production stage. Appendix A.4 contains further details.
Consider the setup in Section 2, but now suppose firms know that prices depend on
quantity according to demand equation (3). Substituting this into their profit equations and
maximising gives equilibrium outputs such that Lemma 1 continues to hold. In the lobbying
stage, compared to the previous case, the equilibrium taxes are distorted downwards, as the
government addresses the market failure resulting from Cournot competition. This use of
an environmental tax as an instrument of competition policy complicates the solutions, but
they retain the key properties needed for the final results: τ ∗(G,G) ∈ R, d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) > 0,
and d
dλ
τ ∗(B,B) < 0. Solving the investment stage establishes that the (G,B) equilibrium
exists and becomes more likely as λ increases. Appendix A.4 gives further details.33
33The model can be re-solved for other competitive environments. Hotelling competition gives particularly
concise analytical solutions. Again, the results continue to hold, though they are inevitably made more
complex by the government using the emissions tax as an instrument of competition policy as well as
environmental policy.
30
A final point to make about market structure is a more general one. Abstracting away
from specific assumptions, the results found here will qualitatively hold so long as total
profits are increasing in the government’s environmental protection instrument. Instead of
a tax, this instrument could most obviously be a reduction in permits under a cap and
trade scheme. Hepburn et al. (2013) characterise quite general conditions under which the
equivalent of d
dτ
∑
pi∗i > 0 holds. That it does often hold should not be too surprising a result:
environmental protection frequently involves putting a price on externalities where previously
there was none, generating environmental rents which can at least partially accrue to firms.
Reinforcing this effect, governments often give away large quantities of permits to firms,
especially as scheme is introduced. Hence, though environmental regulation can sometimes
shrink markets, getting a share of the new rents often ensures the winners gain more than
the losers lose. Therefore Lemma 1 or its equivalent is arguably a more general property of
economies than might initially be supposed.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a model of environmental protection in a situation where firms can
lobby the government over the level of an emissions tax and use it as a means to potentially
steal market share from their competitors. The paper focused on the equilibrium where one
firm goes green, lobbies for a high emissions tax and gains market share from its rival, who
stays brown and lobbies to try to lower the tax. The equilibrium tax is increasingly distorted
above the Pigouvian level as the government becomes more open to lobbying. I show there
are situations where it is only because of lobbying that the economy ends up with one green
firm instead of none. The equilibrium where both firms go green is also characterised, and
here the threat of loss of market share helps to sustain the equilibrium. In both cases,
lobbying-induced switches to a greener economy are welfare improving.
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The findings in this paper illustrate a broader point, that we ought to think carefully
about why there might be conflict between corporate interests and environmental protection,
and whether it is inevitable. Certainly profit maximising behaviour, particularly when it
comes to minimising costs,34 can mean these two forces pull in opposite directions. But the
creation of environmental rents and the opportunity to use regulation to gain a competitive
advantage over a rival are both powerful reasons for profit maximising firms to support
environmental protection. Such political support can have a major impact on the extent to
which the environment is protected.
I have argued this model explains some otherwise puzzling examples of environmental
lobbying by polluting firms. However, the model is also a bad predictor of the political
economy of environmental protection much of the time - since polluting industries are often
united in opposing regulation - a fact which is itself interesting since it suggests that there
may be other important effects at work. Three potentially plausible frictions that would
generate this result are as follows.
The first, and perhaps most interesting, explanation could be collusion. Firm collusion in
the product market has been extensively studied, but it is not the only arena in which firms
may be more or less competitive. The model presented here features a highly competitive
political stage (in the sense that lobbying is non-cooperative), but perhaps in reality the
firms collude, at least to some extent. If the determinants of political collusion are similar to
the those of product market collusion, concentrated, established industries that cooperate on
other matters might be expected to collude politically and stay brown rather than maximise
their individual profits and go green. Both industry and environmental lobbyists often
emphasise the practical importance of Trade Associations, the industry-wide lobby groups
through which much of each firm’s lobbying in reality takes place. In order to function,
34The 1984 Union Carbide chemical leak in Bhopal was a particularly deadly and long lasting environmental
disaster (see Dhara and Dhara (2002)). Aggressive cost cutting is often said to be its cause, as it was with
the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
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these institutions foster consensus and cooperation among their members, or, in other words,
collusion. Firms’ lobbyists are often not keen to deviate from a collusive outcome, either for
rational repeated game-type reasons, or perhaps for ingrained social and institutional ones.35
A second plausible explanation could be due to uncertainty over government policy. The
green firm needs the tax to stay in place and not be changed by future governments, which is
the case by construction in the simple model presented here. In reality, however, governments
behave less predictably and newly elected governments, for example, often cancel taxes or
subsidies introduced by their predecessors. Going green is therefore a risky investment, and
companies may decide they don’t want the uncertainty in their revenues and may rationally
choose to stay brown.
Third, it may be that (due to asymmetries not modelled above) the firms that stand
to lose are large incumbents, and those that stand to gain are either small incumbents or
entrants. Such firms are likely to be liquidity constrained in their lobbying activities, and
may face other barriers to lobbying such as less developed networks with policymakers. In
such circumstances, lobbying may not in equilibrium result in a large enough environmental
tax for a firm to choose to go green. Whatever the exact mechanism, some additional friction
or imperfection is needed before it can be shown that corporate lobbying inevitably harms
the environment. Given this may often have large consequences, further, perhaps empirical,
work in this area may be fruitful.
35Wider social and cultural factors may also play a role in determining the extent of collusion, for example in
explaining why European oil and gas producers lobbied for a carbon price in 2015 when their US counterparts
did not.
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A Appendix
A.1 Full analytical solutions to the subgames
x1 x2 p pi1 pi2
(G,G) 2
b+4
2
b+4
1
b+4
1
(b+4)2
1
(b+4)2
(G,B) 4τ+2
b+4
2−(2+b)2τ
b+4
2τ+1
b+4
(2τ+1)2
(b+4)2
(1−(2+b)τ)2
(b+4)2
(B,B) 2(1−bτ)
b+4
2(1−bτ)
b+4
4τ+1
b+4
(1−bτ)2
(b+4)2
(1−bτ)2
(b+4)2
Production subgame equilibrium outcomes (13)
τ ∗ c∗1 c
∗
2
(G,G) ∈ R 0 0
(G,B) 8η+b(6η+bη−λ)
8(1−λ)+b(6−4λ−bλ+b)
4λ(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)2
λ(b+2)2(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(b2+6b−4λ+8)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)2
(B,B) 4η+bη−λ
4+(1−λ)b
bλ(bη−1)2
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
bλ(bη−1)2
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
Lobbying subgame equilibrium outcomes (14)
G B
G
1
(b+4)2
− s
1
(b+4)2
− s
(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
−(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8) − s
(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(−6b+8λ+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)(−6b+4λ−b2−8)
B
(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(−6b+8λ+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)(−6b+4λ−b2−8)
(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
−(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8) − s
2(bη−1)2(b+4)
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
2(bη−1)2(b+4)
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
Investment subgame payoff matrix (15)
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A.2 Proofs
Lemma 1
Proof. Using production equilibrium outcomes (13), we find d
dτ
∑
pii(τ, (G,B)) =
2(8τ−b+4bτ+b2τ)
(b+4)2
,
which is positive if τ > b
4b+b2+8
∈ [0,
√
2−1
4
] for all b ∈ R≥0. The results from the next stage
verify that, in the equilibria of interest, τ always satisfies the above inequality.
Proposition 1
Proof. (i) There are parameters for which S is non-empty if |S|> 0. Let ss = maxS,
obtained by substituting values from payoff matrix (15) into no-deviation condition (11).
Likewise let ss = minS, obtained by substituting values from payoff matrix (15) into no-
deviation condition (12). |S|= ss−ss, but the full analytical expression for |S| and subsequent
quantities is long, so I proceed in this and the next two proofs as follows. First, I demonstrate
the relevant result at b = 0, i.e. when demand is inelastic. Second, if the relevant expression
is continuous in b at b = 0, then any result true at b = 0 must also be true for b > 0 but
close to 0. (The large b case is considered graphically in Section 3.3.) Proceeding in this way,
|S|b=0= λ2−λ+8η28(1−λ)(2−λ) , which is positive if η > (λ(1−λ)8 )
1
2 . η >
√
2
8
≈ 0.18 guarantees |S|> 0 for
all λ ∈ R≥0 that give an interior solution. Finally, limb→0(|S|) = |S|b=0, so |S| is continuous
in b at b = 0.
(ii) Differentiating gives d
dλ
|S|∣∣
b=0
= (12−8λ)η
2−(1−λ)2
4(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 which is positive for η >
1−λ
2(3−2λ)1/2 .
η >
√
3
6
≈ 0.29 guarantees d
dλ
|S|> 0 for all λ ∈ R≥0 that give an interior solution. Finally,
limb→0( ddλ |S|) = |S|b=0, so ddλ |S| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 2
Proof. (i) S ′ is non-empty if |S ′|> 0, where |S ′(λ)|= ss(λ) − ss(0). Using maximum in-
vestment cost ss(λ) from the above proof, |S ′|b=0= 8η+λ2−λ+8η2−8λη16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Hence |S ′|> 0 if
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η > λ−1+
√
2
√−3λ+λ2+2
2(3−λ) ; η >
1
6
ensures this holds for all λ ∈ R≥0 that gives an interior
solution. Finally, limb→0(|S ′|) = |S|b=0, so |S ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
(ii) Differentiating and then setting b = 0 gives d
dλ
|S ′|∣∣
b=0
= (2η+1−λ)(λ+6η−4λη−1)
8(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 . This is
positive if η > 1−λ
2(3−2λ) ; η >
1
6
ensures this holds for all λ ∈ R≥0 that gives an interior
solution. Finally, limb→0( ddλ |S ′|) = ddλ |S ′|
∣∣
b=0
, so d
dλ
|S ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 3
Proof. The form of the proof is the same as for Proposition 2. (i) T ′ is non-empty if |T ′|> 0,
where |T ′(λ)|= sT (λ) − sT (0) and sT = max T ′. Substituting payoff matrix (15) into no-
deviation condition (11) gives sT , which then gives |T ′|b=0= λ(4η−λ−12η2−4λη+4λη2+1)16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Hence
|T ′|> 0 if η > 1−λ+
√
2
√
(1−λ)(2−λ)
2(3−λ) , which holds for all (λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior
solution. Finally, limb→0(|T ′|) = |T |b=0, so |T ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
(ii) Differentiating and then setting b = 0 gives d
dλ
|T ′|= (1−λ+6η−4λη)(1−λ−2η)
8(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 . Again this is
positive if η < 1−λ
2
, which holds for all (λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior solution. Finally,
limb→0( ddλ |T ′|) = ddλ |T ′|
∣∣
b=0
, so d
dλ
|T ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 4
Proof. Let sY = max Y , that is sY is the largest investment cost for which (G,B) 
(B,B). S ′ ⊂ Y when sY > sS. Using indirect welfare function W (f), we can calculate
sY = W (G,B) − W (B,B). The limits as b → 0 are limb→0(sY ) = η(−2λ+η+λ2−2λη+1)2(λ−1)2 and
limb→0(sS) =
(λ2−λ+8η2)
8(λ2−3λ+2) . Using these results, in the b → 0 limit, sY (λ) > sS holds if
(16λ2 − 32λ + 8)η2 + (24λ2 − 8λ3 − 24λ + 8)η + (λ3 − 2λ2 + λ) > 0. Solving for η, it can
be shown that this holds for any (λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior solution. Note that at
b = 0, for welfare analysis we must use the part of the utility function specified in footnote
22. This then ensures continuity in all the relevant expressions at b = 0.
Proposition 5
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Proof. Let sZ = max Z, that is sZ is the largest investment cost for which (G,G) 
(G,B). T ′ ⊂ Z when sZ > sT . Using indirect welfare function W (f), we can calculate
sZ = W (G,G) − W (G,B). The limits as b → 0 are limb→0(sZ) = η(−2λ−η+λ2+2λη+1)2(1−λ)2 and
limb→0(sT ) =
λ−λ2−8λη−8η2+8η
16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Using these results, in the b → 0 limit, sZ > sT holds if η ∈
[ (1−λ)(−4λ+2λ
2+1−√2L(λ))
4(2λ2−4λ+1) ,
(1−λ)(−4λ+2λ2+1+√2L(λ))
4(2λ2−4λ+1) ] where L(λ) =
√−9λ+ 16λ2 − 10λ3 + 2λ4 + 2.
Any η giving an interior solution lies in the above interval. Note that at b = 0, for welfare
analysis we must use the part of the utility function specified in footnote 22. This then
ensures continuity in all the relevant expressions at b = 0.
A.3 n-firm generalisation
Stage 3: Production
Let nG be the number of firms that chose fi = G in stage 1. The investment profile
f ∈ {G,B}n is therefore summarised by nG. Given nG and tax τ chosen in stages 1 and 2,
firms choose their level of output xi to maximise their profits. Assuming all firms that made
the same investment choice behave in the same way, and denoting as before variables for a
firm that chose fi = G with a G subscript and those that chose fi = B with a B subscript,
the stage 3 equilibrium is given by outputs x∗G(τ, nG), x
∗
B(τ, nG), with corresponding prices
and profits p∗(τ, nG), pi∗G(τ, nG), pi
∗
B(τ, nG). As before, any firm that has gone green gains
from a higher tax and those that stayed brown gain from a lower tax. Lemma 1 continues
to hold since the sum of all firms profits is increasing in τ .
Stage 2: Lobbying
Knowing how a tax will impact their profits and taking nG as given, the firms non-
cooperatively choose their lobbying contribution functions Ci(τ).
36 The government max-
36For example, all the green firms don’t form a special interest group and coordinate their lobbying. This
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imises a weighted sum of social welfare and political contributions as before. The equilibrium
is an emissions tax τ ∗ and pair of contribution functions (C∗G(τ), C
∗
B(τ)) that satisfy the two
equilibrium conditions set out in Section 3. When b = 0, solving gives τ ∗(nG) =
η
1−λ , and
values of c∗i (nG) that are generalisations of the n = 2 case. As in the two firm case, lobbying
results in the emissions tax being increasingly distorted above the Pigouvian level. This is a
consequence of Lemma 2, which it was previously noted holds for any n and therefore applies
in this setting.
Stage 1: Investment
Having shown that green firms will successfully lobby to distort the emissions tax above
the Pigouvian level, it only remains to show that some firms will in equilibrium choose to
go green in the investment stage. An equilibrium of the investment subgame is a profile of
choices f ∈ {G,B}n, or equivalently a value of nG ∈ {0, ..., n}, such that no firm gains from
unilaterally deviating. That is, given the choices of the other firms, no firm choosing G could
gain from deviating to B and no firm choosing B could gain from deviating to G, as given
respectively by
pi∗G(nG)− c∗G(nG)− s ≥ pi∗B(nG − 1)− c∗B(nG − 1) (16)
pi∗B(nG)− c∗B(nG) ≥ pi∗G(nG + 1)− c∗G(nG + 1)− s (17)
An equilibrium is a value of nG that satisfies both equations. In principle all the results in
the propositions in Section 3 can be replicated using the equations derived in this section,
but most of the analytical solutions are not tractable. I therefore present, in the main
body of the article, the small λ case analytically, and then give a graphical example of the
more general case to demonstrate the comparative statics. Following Section 3, define set
implicitly assumes the firms have not solved the collective action problem that prevents them from colluding
at the lobbying stage. This issue is briefly discussed in Section 6.
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S(nG) = {s ∈ R≥0 : nG satisfies (16) and (17)}. That is, S(nG) is the set of investment costs
that supports nG firms going green in equilibrium.
Proposition 6
Proof. Part (i): Consider the case where λ = 0, giving |S(nG)|= 2η2n2 (n − 1), which is inde-
pendent of nG. |S(nG)|> 0 therefore holds for all nG and any n ≥ 2. limλ→0(|S(nG)|) =
|S(nG)|λ=0, so |S(nG)| is continuous in λ at λ = 0, hence the above results continue to hold
for small λ. Part (ii): follows from |S(nG)|= 2η2n2 (n − 1) when λ = 0, and |S(nG)| being
continuous in λ at λ = 0.
A.4 Cournot competition
Consider a set up identical to that in Section 2, except that each firm maximises its profits
believing that its own and the other firm’s output affects prices according to demand equation
(3). For analytical simplicity, consider the b = 1 case. Solving in exactly the same way as in
Section 3, we get:
ss =
11 005λ+ 13 836η + 14 375λ2 − 53 125λ3 + 15 625λ4 + 582η2 −
33 750λ2η2 − 83 260λη + 17 880λη2 + 112 500λ2η − 12 500λ3η − 3168
5(λ− 1)(λ− 2)(145λ− 47)(125λ− 47)
,
(18)
ss =
25(−400λ2 − 4900λη + 605λ− 6125η2 + 5390η − 744)
49(47− 145λ)(47− 20λ) (19)
Using these and subsequent expressions, it is possible to obtain the results in the Proposi-
tions in the main text. Given the complexity of these expressions, numerical examples (not
included in the final article) are the easiest way to establish many of the results.
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A.5 Corner solutions
A corner solution in the production subgame is a possibility following f = (G,B). If the
emissions tax τ is high enough then the brown firm will want to choose negative output by
(13) when τ > 1
b+2
. Given equilibrium tax rates (14) from the lobbying stage, we have a
corner solution if η > b−2λ+2
4b+b2+4
. Intuitively, if the environmental problem is too severe, the
government will want to set a tax that entirely prohibits polluting production. The corner
solution to the production and lobbying subgames is given by:
x∗G(G,B) =
2
b+′ 2
, x∗B(G,B) = 0, pi
∗
G(G,B) =
1
(b+ 2)2
, pi∗B(G,B) = 0
τ ∗(G,B) =
1
b+ 2
, c∗G(G,B) =
(2η + bη − 1)2
λ(b+ 2)(b− 2λ− bλ+ 4) , c
∗
B(G,B) = 0
(20)
These results can then be substituted into production outcomes (13) and welfare equation
(4) to give investment subgame reduced form payoffs. The corner solutions do not feature
in the analytical results, but they are shown in the graphical results.
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